The Scam Industry Is Becoming a Big Problem in India
The Scam Industry Is Becoming a Big Problem in India
According to the FBI, American nationals lost around $50 million to one network of online scammers based in India.
On September 15, investigators raided three call centers in Pune and Patiala, finding around 220 people at work. According to India’s Enforcement Directorate, the premises were being used to defraud Americans. Investigators said that they were establishing the workers’ identities and roles.
Officers also searched a Chandigarh property linked to a suspected organizer. They seized 66 mobile phones, 13 laptops, and unspecified records. Investigators said that they were examining calling scripts, internet telephony systems, and payment routes.
The published account did not provide an overall figure for victims’ losses.
Months earlier, another investigation exposed the damage one India-based network could inflict. An American woman’s $1.7 million loss helped investigators connect other victims to the operation. The FBI subsequently attributed more than $48.7 million in reported losses among over 600 American victims to the network. Indian authorities arrested six alleged leaders in December 2025.
These cases reveal an enduring threat to American households, while also hurting India’s image abroad. Organized networks operating from India can reach victims thousands of miles away. As has happened with Cambodia’s scam centers, a raid may shut down one office while the people who hire workers, move the money, and coordinate from outside remain untouched.
The Business of Scamming
The criminal organizations behind these calls can resemble a conventional business. A 2024 study published by Itad and commissioned by Britain’s Home Office described larger Indian scam centers with management structures, staff shifts, human resources departments, and quality control functions. It also documented recruitment agencies, prepared scripts, English and accent training, and performance incentives.
Roles can be divided between “openers,” who establish contact, and “closers,” who persuade victims to surrender money. Beyond the telephone operators sit facilitators who supply websites, deceptive pop-ups, recruitment services, and various forms of money laundering. The study also identified markets for phone numbers, calling scripts, and victim profiles. These arrangements allow different participants to specialize in separate parts of the fraud.
Reuters reported in 2016 that former workers at scam centers near Mumbai described memorizing scripts, learning from floor managers, and receiving commissions or incentives. The accounts describe a workplace where securing a payment from a victim could increase an employee’s earnings.
Technology helps conceal the operation. In a Noida case announced in July 2025, Britain’s National Crime Agency described spoofed telephone numbers and internet calls routed through servers in several countries. The scam center in Noida targeted both British and American victims. A familiar-looking number on a screen offered no reliable indication of where the caller actually worked.
An office can make a scam look like a real business. Reporting from Maharashtra has described scam centers posing as IT or outsourcing firms, while poor verification of businesses made such operations harder to detect.
How Scammers Extract Money
The details differ between networks, but documented cases show a recurring progression from an alarming first contact to demands for money.
Stage one is intended to trigger initial fear and gain attention from the intended victim. In technical support fraud, a person browsing the internet sees a warning claiming that their computer has been infected or compromised. The message supplies a telephone number. Calling it connects the victim to someone offering to resolve the supposed emergency. In the Noida case, investigators said callers falsely presented themselves as Microsoft employees and charged for unnecessary repairs.
Other schemes begin with unsolicited calls claiming unpaid taxes, compromised identities or criminal investigations. The goal is to create a false sense of urgency and then urge action before the victim has time to check it.
Scammers reinforce their claims through multiple impersonations. A supposed technical support worker may introduce a bank representative, followed by someone claiming government authority. Each apparent handover makes the preceding story seem independently confirmed.
The FBI’s warning about “Phantom Hacker” scams describes forged correspondence on government letterheads and instructions to keep transfers secret. The victim is encouraged to distrust the very people who could interrupt the fraud. The caller says the conversation must stay private to protect the victim. That stops the victim from asking someone else for advice.
Some operators persuade victims to install remote-access software. This can allow the scammer to inspect the computer and watch as the victim opens financial accounts. The supposed repair becomes an opportunity to identify available savings. A second impersonator then claims those funds face immediate danger and must be moved to a supposedly secure account.
In other schemes, threats of arrest or deportation supply the pressure. American prosecutions have documented India-based callers impersonating tax and immigration authorities to extract payments. The victim is made to believe that following instructions will protect a home, retirement account, or legal status. That belief is central to the deception.
Payment methods vary. Gift cards and prepaid cards allow scammers to demand value without asking victims to send money directly to an identifiable caller. Once card details are surrendered, criminals can use or transfer the value.
Cryptocurrency offers another route. Victims may be instructed to withdraw savings, buy digital assets and send them to wallets controlled by the fraud network. Wire transfers can similarly move money into accounts controlled by intermediaries. These methods feature in documented call-center investigations.
Cash and gold introduce a physical collection stage. The FBI has warned that scammers direct victims to buy precious metals or withdraw cash for supposed safekeeping, then dispatch couriers to collect them. The person arriving at an American doorstep can therefore be part of a fraud directed from abroad.
Money laundering adds further distance between the victim and the organizers. In one India-based operation that was prosecuted in the U.S. state of Virginia, American authorities documented couriers, bank accounts, and hawala transfers used to move proceeds. Such arrangements complicate efforts to trace the money and identify who ultimately received it.
After the transfer, the scammers may cease contact, leaving victims with unanswered calls and missing savings. But some schemes continue demanding transfers over days or months, so the first payment does not necessarily end the manipulation.
Either way, by the time a victim recognizes the fraud, the lost money may already have moved through several hands.
The same methods are used against victims in other countries. Canada’s Project OCTAVIA targeted callers impersonating tax officials; reported losses to that particular scam fell from C$6.4 million in 2018 to C$1.4 million in 2019.
In Australia, police alleged that Hyderabad-based Ridge IT Solutions had taken 80-100 million rupees from Australians over roughly two years. The allegations included payments passing through Australian accounts before moving toward India.
Why Scam Centers Survive
India is not unique in hosting these scam centers. The online scam industry is global, and the financial scale is substantial. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received 1,008,597 complaints in 2025, with reported losses of $20.9 billion. People aged 60 and older reported approximately $7.7 billion in losses. Complaints involving technical or customer support fraud and government impersonation together exceeded 80,000, with losses above $2.9 billion.
Those totals cover perpetrators worldwide, and IC3 also receives complaints from outside the United States. These figures cannot be presented as American losses caused entirely by India-based centers; IC3 has not established the share of the 2025 losses originating from operations in India.
Nevertheless, India’s role is well documented: in a 2022 podcast, the FBI said most technical-support and telephone scams targeting Americans originated from India. And while scam operations based in Southeast Asia, especially Cambodia, have received more attention of late, scam centers operating out of India remain less discussed.
Recovering money presents a daunting challenge. Investigators must identify recipients, trace subsequent transfers, and seek the necessary legal cooperation. American agents cannot simply conduct arrests in India. Even successful prosecutions do not guarantee that every victim will receive full repayment. Often, the scammers are able to keep their ill-gotten gains, and use them to fund further crimes.
Scam centers can reopen after raids because the system around them often remains in place. In December 2025, The Indian Express reported concerns from Maharashtra police about weak business verification, scrutiny of network connections and coordination. Its reporting also described operations shifting toward smaller towns offering cheaper premises and access to English-speaking workers.
Those conditions lower the practical barriers to reopening. A group with access to staff, scripts, communications services, and payment intermediaries can establish another office even after one address is exposed.
Jurisdiction adds delay. Victims report crimes in the United States, relevant records may belong to banks or technology companies elsewhere, callers operate in India, and accomplices handling payments may be in another country. Investigators have to connect those dots before evidence can support arrests and prosecutions.
Within India, policing is primarily a state responsibility, while networks may operate across state boundaries. The Itad study identified limited collaboration between jurisdictions as an obstacle to connecting linked operations.
The Noida investigation revealed the work involved. It took 18 months of cooperation involving the Indian CBI, Britain’s National Crime Agency, the U.S. FBI, and Microsoft before the July 2025 raid.
In July 2025, the CBI arrested two people at a Noida call center that British investigators said had contacted more than 100 people in the UK. British victims were believed to have lost more than 390,000 pounds. Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police Hyderabad(RCMP) said its Project OCTAVIA investigation had helped shut down 39 illegal call centers in the Noida and New Delhi areas.
In November 2025, Hyderabad police arrested nine people at an alleged fake call center targeting Australians.
These cases form part of a wider enforcement effort. According to the FBI, cooperation with Indian agencies since 2022 has involved more than 1,200 information exchanges and more than 475 arrests across 27 joint operations. That includes about 175 arrests in 13 joint operations in 2025 alone.
The harder task is finding the people who run these scams, move the money, and help new centers open. Raids can close an office, but another may take its place. Victims also need a chance to get their money back.
Until that changes, these networks can keep making money by frightening people in the United States and beyond. They also hurt India’s global image at a time when the country wants to be seen as a reliable technology and services hub.
Saqlain Rizve/The Diplomat
